Israel's Minimalist War
By Greg Reeson

As the Israeli offensive into southern Lebanon unfolded in painstakingly slow fashion, reports of discontent from the troops on the ground made their way into news stories on several of the major cable news networks. The grumblings of the soldiers were reminiscent of the sentiments of U.S. Marines after the Hezbollah bombing of their Beirut barracks in 1983, when one Marine was quoted as saying, ?œEither turn us loose or send us home.??/P>

Whether it was due to stiff Hezbollah resistance, an aversion to IDF casualties, or uncertainty in a war plan that placed too much emphasis on air power, the Israelis fought a minimalist war that failed to achieve any of the conditions set by Prime Minister Olmert for a cessation of hostilities.

At the beginning of the conflict, Olmert characterized the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers as ?œan act of war??that would result in a ?œvery painful??response from the IDF. Immediately the Israelis began preparations for what appeared to be a massive, sustained assault into Lebanon with the objective of eliminating Hezbollah?™s ability to conduct attacks. The Israeli Air Force began the systematic targeting of Hezbollah fighting positions, key infrastructure, and re-supply routes, including the Beirut airport and roads connecting Lebanon to Syria. The coast was blockaded by the Israeli Navy and IDF soldiers began to mass on the border, in obvious preparation for the ground assault that would be necessary if Hezbollah was to be destroyed as a military force.