As the air campaign prepared the battlefield, the Israeli government began calling up reserve forces, a move that always causes serious disruptions to Israeli economic activity. Private intelligence organizations debated the exact timing of the assault, but all agreed the full-scale invasion of Lebanon was inevitable if Israel truly wanted to settle the Hezbollah question once and for all.

All indications were that this time the Israelis were serious. Reserves were mobilized, troops were massed at the border, a relentless air campaign was underway, public support for the government was at an all-time high, and Olmert promised to destroy the terrorist organization that called for the destruction of Israel in its charter.

But Olmert?™s government did not deliver. The IDF conducted limited raids and border skirmishes while political waffling in Jerusalem relied on the IAF to win the battle with minimal loss of Israeli life. Statements from Israeli officials revealed a divided government that could not decide on the appropriate course of action. Faced with limited time to accomplish its objectives, the Israeli government wasted the precious diplomatic cover provided by the United States.

To destroy Hezbollah, Israel needed to address threats north of the Litani River and in the Bekaa Valley, the base of the group?™s power and home to its terrorist training facilities. Confining offensive operations to the south of Lebanon was insufficient to address the threat posed by Nasrallah and his minions.

Not until time ran out, in the form of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 calling for an immediate cease-fire, did Israel launch the long-awaited ground invasion. By waiting until diplomacy forced an end to the fighting, the Israelis failed to accomplish the objectives laid out when the conflict began in mid-July.